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The Afghan endgame has got off to an exciting start. The great reconciliation with the Taliban is all set to begin. Through sustained diplomatic efforts, Washington has gained acceptance ― in the domestic opinion in the United States as well as internationally ― of the idea that durable peace in Afghanistan can be reached only through an inclusive settlement involving the reconciliation of the Taliban. No one today (including the visceral critics of the Taliban in the Indian establishment) would demur about the idea of reconciling the Taliban that seemed so bizarre as recently as in January 2010, when it was first introduced at the London peace conference. In fact, no Indian official any longer quibbles over the subtle difference between ‘reintegration' and ‘reconciliation' in the diplomatic idiom.
‘TALIBAN NOT OUR ENEMY'
At any rate, it is crystal clear that the Obama administration intends to press ahead with the idea ― and even speed up its realisation ― no matter what others think about it. If Vice-President Joseph Biden is to be taken on his word, Washington has unceremoniously camiseta retro dumped the pre-conditions it underlined at the London conference. To quote Mr. Biden, the Taliban "per se is not our [U.S.'] enemy." Clearly, the strategic ambiguity over the ultimate destiny of the Taliban in mainstream Afghan political life has been conclusively cleared and the U.S. is open about its willingness ― nay, keenness ― to accommodate the Taliban in the power structure. So, the tantalising part of the U.S. strategy now narrows down to the ‘great game.' Put differently, what the U.S.' ‘hidden agenda' could be with retro camisetas regard to the western military presence in the region beyond 2014, which is the timeline set for the drawdown of the U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Here, too, the strategic ambiguity equipacion barcelona 2012 is being incrementally removed with a steady, calibrated spate of statements coyly suggesting Washington's determination to retain a permanent military presence, including combat troops, for itself and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. What 2012 will unfold is the high drama of bringing the Taliban in from the cold and getting it to accept the idea of a long-term U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, which it has so far opposed.
This is where Qatar comes in. The Obama administration places trust in the skill Qatar displayed in Libya (and, to an extent, in Egypt) in finessing seemingly intractable Islamist groups by making them susceptible to the way of all flesh. The western accounts claim Qatar spent $450 million on Libya. Thanks to the charming Qatari ally, the U.S. has been able to catapult itself to the ‘right side of history' in the Middle East alongside the Islamists on the surge. The Obama administration is optimistic about bringing the Taliban to Doha and exposing it to the magical Qatari ways of relaxing even Islamists with a stubbornly religious outlook. There could be other countries in the region such as Turkey or Saudi Arabia that may be ‘Islamic' but they do not possess the special skills that Qatar seems to have. All said, therefore, it stands to reason that the head of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, Ahmed Shuja Pasha, travelled to Doha recently to make an on-the-spot assessment of the prospects of Qatar doing a ‘Libya' on the Taliban.